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1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper I intend to establish that the semantics of third-person pronouns is 
cross-linguistically variable, and in particular, that not all languages possess third-
person pronouns which are definite, in the sense of displaying familiarity effects. I 
will argue for this on the basis of data from St’át’imcets (Lillooet Salish). I will 
then account for the St’át’imcets data in terms of independently-established 
differences between St’át’imcets and more familiar languages such as English.  
 First, some background. In English, third-person pronouns like she, it or 
they are definite. In Heim’s (1982) and Kamp’s (1981) frameworks, pronouns are 
necessarily familiar: they introduce variables which are already present in Dom(F) 
or the DRS. Many have proposed that pronouns, on at least some of their uses, are 
disguised definite descriptions; see Cooper (1979), Heim (1990), Neale (1990), 
von Fintel (1994), Chierchia (1995), Sauerland (2000), among others. And some 
have claimed that third-person pronouns are in fact definite determiners; see 
Postal (1966), and more recently Elbourne (2001, 2005), who argues that (1a) has 
‘an LF almost or precisely identical to’ that of (1b) (Elbourne 2005:42).  
 
(1) a. Every man who owns a donkey beats it. 
 b. Every man who owns a donkey beats the donkey. 
 
According to Elbourne, it has the same semantics as the. The pronoun and the 
determiner differ merely in that the former involves NP-deletion.1 
 Elbourne’s claim that in English, pronouns are definite determiners raises 
an important cross-linguistic question: in languages which lack definite 
determiners, what is the semantics of third-person pronouns? Does the 
pronoun/determiner parallel break down in such languages? Or do we instead find 
that the semantics of third-person pronouns covaries with that of determiners? 
 Here I will address these questions by investigating the semantics of 
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pronouns in a language which lacks definite determiners, namely St’át’imcets. 
St’át’imcets lacks any determiners which display familiarity effects (Matthewson 
1998, 1999). Strikingly, third-person pronouns in this language display a parallel 
result: as observed by Davis (2006), third-person pronouns in St’át’imcets also 
lack familiarity effects. An example is given in (2), which shows that St’át’imcets 
allows backwards pronominalization in a context in which English normally does 
not (as seen by the infelicity of the English gloss).2  
 
(2) súcwt-en-as  ta=kúkwpi7=a  proERG. 
 recognize-DIR-3ERG DET=chief=EXIS proERG.   
  tálh-lec aylh s=Mary  
  stand.up-AUT then NOM=Mary 
 ‘Shei recognized the chief. # Then Maryi
 
stood up.’   (Davis 2006) 
 
 Below, I provide a range of empirical evidence in favor of the proposal 
that St’át’imcets pronouns are indefinite. I will conclude that third-person 
pronouns vary in their semantics cross-linguistically, and that the variation seems 
to be linked to independent variation in the semantics of determiners.  
 However, the story is not quite that simple as that. I will also show that the 
pronoun/determiner parallel in St’át’imcets is not complete, since unlike full DPs, 
pronouns can receive bound variable, E-type, and donkey interpretations. The 
breakdown in the pronoun/determiner parallel is illustrated for donkey anaphora 
in (3) vs. (4). 
 
(3) tákem i=sqáyqeycw=a wa7 az’ ku=sqáxa7 wa7  
 all DET.PL=men=EXIS IMPF buy DET=dog IMPF  
  seksek-n-ítas  proABS 
  beat-DIR-3PL.ERG proABS 
 ‘Every man who buys a dog beats it.’ 
 
(4)    #tákem i=sqáyqeycw=a wa7 az’ ku=sqáxa7 wa7  
 all DET.PL=men=EXIS IMPF buy DET=dog IMPF  
  seksek-n-ítas ti=sqáx7=a 
  beat-DIR-3PL.ERG DET=dog=EXIS 
 ‘Every man who buys a dog beats the dog.’ 
 [only means every man who buys a dog beats one particular dog, say Fido] 
 
The challenge, then, is to find a semantics for St’át’imcets pronouns and 
determiners which captures the shared absence of a familiarity effect, but blocks 
donkey and bound interpretations for full DPs while allowing them for pronouns.  
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 The solution I will propose is as follows. St’át’imcets pronouns and 
determiners share a core semantics similar to that proposed by Elbourne (2005) 
for English it and the. The difference between the languages with respect to 
familiarity effects derives from an independent difference in the nature of 
presuppositions. As I have argued for other presupposition triggers (Matthewson 
2006), the uniqueness presuppositions of pronouns and determiners do not result 
in a discourse familiarity effect in St’át’imcets. Finally, the absence of non-
referential interpretations for full DPs is derived from the deictic presuppositions 
of the overt determiners, which disallow binding of their situation argument. Full 
DPs are forced to pick out a unique individual in the salient discourse situation. 
 The analysis presented here has several theoretical consequences. It 
provides cross-linguistic support for the pronoun/determiner parallel proposed by 
Elbourne and others. It provides evidence for predictable cross-linguistic 
differences in the semantics of pronouns. It provides support for the idea that 
presuppositions in St’át’imcets do not place the same restrictions on the common 
ground as English presuppositions do (Matthewson 2006). Finally, it derives the 
wide-scope effects of full DPs in St’át’imcets via an independently-needed 
situation semantics, without needing to use choice functions as in Matthewson 
(1999, 2001). And in so doing, it offers a solution to an empirical problem for the 
choice function analysis pointed out by Davis (2004).  
 
 
2.  St’át’imcets Third-Person Pronouns
 
 
 
St’át’imcets is an endangered Northern Interior Salish language spoken in the 
southwest interior of British Columbia. There are three sets of third-person 
pronouns in the language: plain, possessive, and emphatic (the last appearing only 
in focused environments). I deal only with the plain set here, although possessive 
pronouns appear to share most if not all relevant properties with the plain set.  
 The default third-person pronoun in St’át’imcets is pro. pro co-occurs 
either with a zero absolutive agreement marker Ø, as in (5a,b), or with an ergative 
agreement suffix -as, as in (5c).
3
  
 
(5) a. qwatsáts=Ø proABS    
  leave=3ABS proABS     
  ‘He/she/they/it left.’    
 
 b. ats’x-en-Ø=lhkan  proABS 
  see-DIR-3ABS=1SG.SUBJ proABS  
  ‘I saw him/her/them/it.’ 
 
 c. ats’x-en-túmulh-as proERG 
  see-DIR-1PL.OBJ-3ERG proERG 
  ‘He/she/they/it saw us.’ 
                                                
3
On the affixal vs. clitic status of the endings, see Davis (2000b). 
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 In the absolutive plural, with a human referent, there is an optional overt 
pronoun wit.4 Davis (2003) argues on the basis of extraction and other evidence 
that unlike the ergative suffix -as or the zero absolutive Ø, wit is a real pronoun, 
not an agreement (see also Roberts 1999). Thus, in (6), there are no pros. The wit 
is itself the pronoun. 
 
(6) a. qwatsáts=wit 
  leave=3PL  
  ‘They left.’ 
 
 b. ats’x-en-wít=kan    
  see-DIR-3PL=1SG.SUBJ   
  ‘I saw them.’    
 
 For the rest of the paper, I will only show pros in example sentences if 
they are relevant, and I will not mark zero absolutive agreement.  
 The first empirical generalization to be established is that pro and wit 
share all the interpretations of English third-person pronouns: they have 
referential, bound variable, donkey, and other E-type interpretations. Referential 
pronouns are illustrated in (7-8). In each case, the pronoun in the last sentence 
refers to the individual(s) introduced in the preceding sentence(s).  
  
(7) wá7=lhkan lexláx-s ta=n-spápz7=a 
 IMPF=1SG.SUBJ remember-CAUS DET=1SG.POSS-grandfather=EXIS 
  s=Síkil, pináni7 i=w=at 
  NOM=Síkil TEMP.DEIC when.PAST=IMPF=1PL.CONJ 
  ka-gúy’t-a lh=at  wa7 ílhen  
   CIRC-sleep-CIRC COMP(IMPF)=1PL.CONJ IMPF eat 
 ‘I remember my grandfather Síkil, when we had fallen asleep while 
eating.’ 
 
 nilh=tu7 s=e=s kwan-túmulh-as proERG nilh   
 FOC=PAST NOM=IMPF=3POSS take(DIR)-1PL.OBJ-3ERG proERG FOC  
  s=a=s tsicw-s-tumúlh-as áta7 ta=sk’ém’ts=a 
  NOM=IMPF=3POSS get.there-CAU-1PL.OBJ-3ERG DEIC DET=door=EXIS 
 ‘He would get us and take us to the door.’ (Matthewson 2005:186) 
 
(8) nilh ni=wa7 tsún-itas James Link skwátsits-s=a 
 FOC DET=IMPF say(DIR)-3PL.ERG James Link name-3POSS=EXIS 
 ‘James Link was his name.’ 
 
 múta7 i=sésq’wez’-s=a George Link múta7 Felix Link 
 and DET.PL=younger.sibling=EXIS George Link and Felix Link  
 ‘And his younger brothers were George Link and Felix Link.’ 
 
                                                
4
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 plan=wit=tu7  aylh tákem wa7 zuqw 
 already=3PL=PAST then all IMPF die 
 ‘They’ve all already died.’   (Matthewson 2005:124) 
    
 Bound pronoun uses of pro and wit are shown in (9-10).  
 
(9) tákem swat pzan-itás  kelh ti=smúlhats=a   
 all who meet(DIR)-3PL.ERG FUT DET=woman=EXIS 
 ti=wa7 xwey-s-twítas  proERG 
  DET=IMPF love-CAUS-3PL.ERG proERG 
 ‘Everyone will meet the woman that he loves.’ 
 
(10) tákem swat wa7 tsut-ánwas k=wa=s  lexlex=wít   
 all who IMPF say-inside DET=IMPF=3POSS smart=3PL 
 ‘Everyone thinks they are smart.’  
 [= each person thinks they themselves are smart]  
 
 Donkey pronouns are illustrated in (11-12); examples are given only with 
pro, as wit does not appear in a clause with two third-person arguments, as 
mentioned in footnote 4. The comment given by the consultant for (12) supports 
the claim that these sentences have typical (universal) donkey-interpretations.  
 
(11) lh=wa=s  s-kaoh  ku=smúlhats, papt=t’u7 wa7  
 COMP=IMPF=3POSS STAT-car DET=woman always=just IMPF  
  ts’ex-n-ás                proABS 
  clean-DIR-3ERG proABS 
 ‘If a woman owns a car, she always cleans it.’ 
 
(12) tákem i=sqáycw=a wa7 s-qáxa7 wa7 sek-en-ítas proABS  
 all DET.PL=man=EXIS IMPF STAT-dog IMPF hit-DIR-3PL.ERG proABS  
 ‘Every man that has a dog hits it.’ 
 
 If one man has five dogs and only hits one of them: “Sounds wrong.” 
 
 Finally, pro and wit may also function as (other types of) E-type pronouns. 
As this generalization has not been established before, I give a range of E-type 
pronoun cases in (13-17).  
 
(13) wa7 tsutánwas k=John kw=s=cuz’ kwámem ku=ts’úqwaz’  
 IMPF think DET=John DET=nom=going.to take DET=fish  
  nílh=t’u7 xát’-min’-as kw=en=cuz’ q’wél-en proABS 
  FOC=just want-RED-3ERG DET=1SG.POSS=going.to cook-DIR proABS 
 ‘John thinks that he will catch a fish, and he hopes that I will cook it.’ 
 
(14) kan  xát’-min’ kw=n=s-tsmal’t,   nilh  
 1SG.SUBJ want-RED DET-1SG.POSS-STAT-offspring FOC  
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  ku=n=k’ul’-s-wit ku=wa7 baseball 
  DET=1SG.POSS=make-CAUS-3PL DET-IMPF baseball  
 ‘I want to have some children and teach them to play baseball.’ 
 
(15) tqilh=t’u7 tákem i=s-cín’=a kaoh wa7 s-radio;  
 almost=just all DET.PL-NOM-long.time=EXIS car IMPF STAT-radio 
  l=ki=núkw=a,  kéla7=t’u7 wa7 áma proABS 
  PREP=DET.PL=other=EXIS first=just IMPF good proABS 
 ‘Almost all old cars have a radio. In some of them, it is a really good one.’ 
  
(16) tákem i=wa7 tsilkst szánucwem sk’wemk’úk’wmi7t wa7 
 all DET.PL-IMPF five year children IMPF 
  ama-s-twítas (i)=skicez7-í=ha, k’ámalh  
  good-CAUS-3PL.ERG (DET.PL)=mother-3PL.POSS=EXIS but 
  i=lán=a q’em’p wi=tsilkst syéy’qtsa7 
  DET.PL=already=EXIS ten 3PL=five girl 
   qvl-s-twítas  proABS 
   bad-CAUS=3PL.ERG proABS 
 ‘Every five-year-old girl loves her mother, and every 15-year old girl 
hates her.’ 
  
(17) Context (“paycheck sentence”): Two women won at bingo last night.  
 
 p’a7cw s=léxlex=s ta=uxwal’-s-táli=ha   
 more NOM=smart=3POSS DET=go.home-CAUS-TOP=EXIS  
  ta=sqláw’-s=a  lhél=ta=pel’p-s-táli=ha proABS  
  DET=money-3POSS=EXIS  PREP=DET=lost-CAUS-TOP=EXIS proABS 
   l=ta=bus=a 
   PREP=DET=bus=EXIS   
 ‘The one who took her money home was smarter than the one who left it 
on the bus.’  
 
 Summarizing so far, we have seen that the two plain third-person 
pronouns in St’át’imcets, pro and wit, share all the core interpretations of English 
pronouns. No variation is apparent yet.  
 
 
3.  A Difference Between St’át’imcets and English Third-Person Pronouns 
 
In this section I will argue that in spite of the similarities seen so far between 
English and St’át’imcets third-person pronouns, there is one striking difference 
between pronouns in the two languages. As already proposed by Davis (2006), the 
St’át’imcets pronouns induce no familiarity effects.5 
 The first type of data involves oral narratives with initial sentences 
containing pronouns whose reference is not determined until later. An example is 
                                                
5
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given in (18), which is the first line of the story ‘The Swimmer’ by Sam Mitchell. 
The translators of the story have made the English version felicitous by inserting a 
full noun phrase, where the St’át’imcets version simply uses pro. 
  
(18) wa7 proABS áku7 káti7,  ka-7ats’x-s-ás-a  lt7u   
 be proABS DEIC DEIC CIRC-see-CAUS-3ERG-CIRC DEIC   
  x7ílh=a  i=wa7  záw-em 
  other.side-DET DET.PL=IMPF fish-MID  
 
 Literal translation: ‘He was there, he caught sight of the ones who were 
fishing over on the other side.’  
 Felicitous English translation: ‘There was this man …’  
      (van Eijk and Williams 1981:72) 
 
 Another example, which involves possessive pronouns but makes the 
same point, is given in (19). This is the first line of the story ‘Grizzly Bear and 
Black Bear’s Children’ by Adelina Williams. The sentence introduces the topical 
discourse referents, the bear cubs, only by referring to them via pronouns. Note 
that the cubs themselves are not digging; thus, the some bears in the English gloss 
does not introduce a discourse referent for the cubs.  
  
(19) wa7 kém’-em i=míxalh=a,  ti=sqatsez7-í=ha  
 IMPF dig.roots-MID DET.PL=bear=EXIS DET-father-3PL.POSS=EXIS 
  múta7 ti-skicez7-í=ha 
  and DET=mother-3PL.POSS=EXIS  (van Eijk and Williams 1981:14) 
 ‘Some bears were digging roots, their father and their mother.’ 
       
 Of course, even in English, stories sometimes begin with out-of-the-blue 
definite descriptions or pronouns, and the reader is expected to accommodate the 
familiarity presupposition. It is also possible that even though (18) and (19) are 
apparently discourse-initial, there was some prior agreement about which story 
was going to be told, and therefore that the referents were familiar to the hearers. 
More convincing evidence for non-familiar pronouns therefore actually comes 
from cases in the middle of stories, since here the discourse context is clear. 
Examples of this type are given in (20-21). In (20), the third line contains a wit 
which comes out of the blue; at this stage of the discourse we have no idea who 
left to go back down the hill. The reference is resolved in the following sentence 
by the mention of boys, but the literal English translation still sounds very odd.  
 
(20) t’íq=kalh  ti=cácl’ep=a   
 arrive=1PL.SUBJ DET=Fountain=EXIS  
 ‘We arrived up at Fountain.’ 
  
 q’íl=lhkalh  áku7, wá…7=lhkalh káku7,  
 get.on.top=1PL.SUBJ DEIC be=1PL.SUBJ DEIC  
 ‘We got there, we stayed there for a while,’ 
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 qwatsáts=wit súxwast múta7 
 leave=3PL descend again 
 ‘and then they left to go back down the hill.’ 
 
 slhay  káti7 ku=s=záyten-s   ku=twéw’w’et 
 overconfident DEIC DET=NOM=business=3POSS DET=boys 
 ‘You know how boys think they can do anything.’  
      (‘The Truck Rolls’ by Bill Edwards) 
 
(21) is a similar case. Here, the pronoun reference is never explicitly resolved.  
 
(21) pákw=kalh-a   tsicw  kent7ú pankúph=a 
 set.off=1PL.SUBJ-CIRC get.there DEIC Vancouver=EXIS 
 ‘We left and went back to Vancouver.’  
 
 “Oh my” kan  tsún-wit “lháp-en=lhkan=tu7  
 “Oh my” 1SG.SUBJ tell(DIR)-3PL forget-DIR=1SG.SUBJ=then 
  ni=n-sts’úqwaz’=a 
  DET=1SG.POSS-fish=EXIS  
 ‘ “Oh my,” I told them, “I forgot my fish.” ’  
 (‘them’ = my husband and children)   (Thoma to appear) 
 
 The non-familiarity of pro and wit is also evidenced in fieldwork 
situations. Although caution is required due to the unnaturalness of the elicitation 
environment, it is striking that backwards pronominalizations are easy to obtain, 
and crucially are acceptable in constructions in which the corresponding English 
glosses are infelicitous. Examples are given in (22-23); see also (2) above.6  
 
(22) ni=s-pála7-s=a [q’7-ál’men proABS], nilh [s=wa7=s  
 DET=NOM-one-3POSS=EXIS eat-want proABS] then [NOM=IMPF=3POSS 
 cwíl’-em  ti=nk’yáp=a  ku=sq’a7-s] 
 seek-MID DET=coyote=EXIS DET=food-3POSS] 
 ‘Once upon a time, he was hungry, so a coyote went looking for his food.’  
      
(23) na=s-pála7-s=a  [táyt=wit], nilh [s=wa7=s 
 DET=NOM-one-3POSS=EXIS [hungry=3PL] then [NOM=IMPF=3POSS 
  cwíl’-em  ku=s7ílhen ta=nk’yáp=a múta7 ta=sxgwálcw=a] 
  seek-MID DET=food DET=coyote=EXIS and DET=fox=EXIS]  
 ‘Once upon a time, theyi were hungry, so [a coyote and a fox]i went 
looking for food.’      (Davis 2006) 
  
 The data presented in this section show that pro and wit are routinely 
volunteered and accepted in contexts in which their reference is not (yet) clear 
                                                
6
The element nilh in these examples is a clausal conjunction, and may not conjoin VPs; see 
Davis (2000a). This rules out an alternative syntactic structure for e.g., (22) whereby two VPs are 
coordinated and there is no pro in the first conjunct.  
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from the discourse context. I conclude that these St’át’imcets pronouns have no 
familiarity requirement. 
 
3.1.  Further Evidence for Indefinite Pronouns 
 
If pro and wit are not definite, then they should be felicitous in prototypical 
indefinite environments such as existential sentences and sluicing contexts.7 As 
far as the language allows us to test this prediction, it is upheld.  
 (24) illustrates the St’át’imcets existential construction. The sentence is 
introduced by the locative-existential predicate wa7; a pivot follows, which may 
not be a strongly quantified phrase.  
 
(24)  wa7 [*tákem / cw7it i=ucwalmícw=a] láku7 l=ti=lep’cálten=a 
 be [all / many DET.PL=person=EXIS] DEIC in-DET-garden=EXIS  
 ‘There are *all / many people in the garden.’ 
 
Placing a pronoun into the pivot position results in an acceptable sentence: 
 
(25)  Context: You are sitting eating breakfast looking out at your garden and 
you see two people walking in the garden. You tell your grandson: 
 
 wá7=wit láku7 l=ti=lep’cálten=a 
 be=3PL DEIC PREP=DET=garden=EXIS 
 ‘There’s them in the garden.’ 
 
 There is an unavoidable wrinkle with (25), since the sentence has an 
alternative structural analysis as ‘They are in the garden’. Under this analysis, the 
wit is simply the subject of the locative predicate wa7 and we may not be dealing 
with an existential construction per se. However, it is significant that wit is 
grammatical in a construction in which strong quantifiers are ruled out (cf. (24)). 
Furthermore, even the alternative structure illustrates an absence of familiarity 
effects. The acceptability of (25) clearly contrasts with the English ‘They are in 
the garden’, which is infelicitous in the given discourse context.  
 A similar situation obtains with sluicing (Chung et al. 1994). The data in 
(26-27) show that sluicing-like structures are felicitous in St’át’imcets with the 
pronouns pro or wit in the position of the necessarily indefinite noun phrase. 
 
(26) Context: You are going camping in a camping ground and you start 
setting up your tent. A guy comes around and says that he is the attendant 
and tells you to pay him $20 for the night. You pay him, even though 
you’re not really sure if he is the right guy or not. Then your husband 
comes back and you tell him: 
 
 xáq’-en=lhkan proABS, t’u7 áoy=t’u7 kw=en=zwát-en 
 pay-DIR=1SG.SUBJ proABS but NEG=just DET=1SG.POSS=know-DIR 
                                                
7
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  lh=swát=as 
  COMP=who=3CONJ 
 ‘I paid him, but I don’t know who.’ 
 
(27) Context: You like to go for late-night walks on the reserve when it’s all 
peaceful. No-one else does that, so you never see anyone. But tonight you 
saw two people in the distance. When you get home you tell your husband 
(discourse-initially): 
 
 i=w=an mám’teq ats’x-en-wít=kan,  t’u7  
 when.PAST=IMPF=1SG.CONJ walk see-DIR-3PL=1SG.SUBJ but  
  áoy=t’u7 kw=en=zwát=en  lh=swát=as 
  NEG=just DET=1SG.POSS=know-DIR COMP=who=3CONJ  
 ‘When I was walking I saw them, but I don’t know who.’ 
 
 As with the existential sentences, there are language-specific reasons why 
(26-27) may not actually be cases of sluicing. In St’át’imcets, wh-words function 
as predicates, so it is impossible to prevent the structure from involving a full 
‘who it was’ clause (Henry Davis, p.c.). However, (26-27) still illustrate the non-
familiarity of the pronouns. The English counterparts containing definite him or 
them are quite infelicitous in the given discourse contexts. 
 In summary, we have used a variety of discourse contexts and three 
(in)definiteness tests, and in no case was there any evidence for a definiteness or 
familiarity effect with St’át’imcets pro and wit. I conclude that these pronouns do 
not carry familiarity presuppositions, and thus that they differ in their semantics 
from English third-person pronouns.  
 
 
4.  A Parallel Between St’át’imcets Pronouns and Determiners  
 
In this section I will show that the lack of familiarity effects demonstrated above 
for pro and wit is shared by St’át’imcets determiners. 
 St’át’imcets possesses two kinds of determiners, neither of which is 
definite. One set are polarity items which are infelicitous in most definite 
environments; see Matthewson (1998) for discussion. The second set of 
determiners, which all include an enclitic =a, are shown in (28). They encode 
distinctions of plurality and spatial distance from the speaker of the utterance.  
 
(28) St’át’imcets determiners (adapted from Matthewson 1998, van Eijk 1997): 
     
   present absent invisible 
 - plural  ti=…=a8 ni=…=a ku=…=a 
 + plural -collective i=…=a nelh=…=a kwelh=…=a 
  + collective  ki=…=a  
                                                
8
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 In Matthewson (1998, 1999) I showed that the determiners ending in =a 
are (i) felicitous in both novel and familiar contexts; (ii) felicitous in existential 
sentences; and (iii) good in sluicing-like contexts. For reasons of space I will 
illustrate only the first property here. In (29), all three sentences come from the 
same story. The novel introduction of the shoemaker in the first line and the 
policeman in the second line contain the determiner ti=…=a; the same determiner 
is used to refer to the familiar policeman in the third line. 
 
(29) wa7 ti7 láti7 [ti=sumíkh=a]   lts7a táown=a 
 IMPF DEMON DEIC [DET=shoemaker=EXIS] DEIC town=EXIS 
 ‘Once there lived this shoemaker here in town.’  
 
 nilh ku7 t’u7 s=tsícw-min-as [ti=wa7(=a)9 zús-cal] 
 FOC REPORT just NOM=go-RED-3ERG [DET=be(=EXIS) tie.up-INTR] 
 ‘He went to a policeman.’  
 
 tsut ku7  [ti=wa7(=a)  zús-cal] …  
 say REPORT [DET=be(=EXIS) tie.up-INTR] 
 ‘The policeman said ...’  
  (van Eijk and Williams 1981:76; cited in Matthewson 1998) 
 
 We have now seen that St’át’imcets determiners and pronouns both lack 
familiarity effects, and it would obviously be a good idea to derive these two facts 
from one generalization. The St’át’imcets facts suggest that it might be possible to 
generalize Elbourne’s (2001, 2005) proposal that in English, pronouns are definite 
determiners. Perhaps in general, the semantics of third-person pronouns in a 
language L is based on the semantics of determiners in L, whatever that is. In the 
next section I begin to explore this idea. 
 
 
5.  Pronouns as Determiners 
 
As mentioned above, Elbourne’s plan to collapse third-person pronouns with 
definite determiners relies largely on the semantic equivalence between (30a-b).  
 
(30) a. Every man who owns a donkey beats it. 
 b. Every man who owns a donkey beats the donkey. 
 
With the pronoun, NP-deletion takes place, as shown in (31). The LFs for the two 
sentences are therefore essentially identical, given the equivalence between it and 
the (Elbourne 2005:42). 
 
(31) Every man who owns a donkey beats it donkey.  
 
 Unlike many of the authors cited above who have analyzed pronouns as 
                                                
9
The enclitic portion of the determiner phonologically deletes after wa7.  
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disguised definite descriptions, Elbourne explicitly equates the pronoun with the 
definite determiner itself. He also generalizes the pronoun-determiner correlation 
to all interpretations of pronouns, including referential and bound variable uses. 
For Elbourne, then, all third-person pronouns are definite articles, with a 
phonologically null NP argument. With donkey pronouns, the deleted NP 
argument is an ordinary NP. With referential and bound variable pronouns, the 
NP argument is an index.10  
 Elbourne’s denotation for the is given in (32). It utilizes a situation 
semantics approach, following Berman (1987), Heim (1990), von Fintel (1994). 
 
(32) [[ the ]]
 g
 = [[ it ]] 
g
 = !f <<s,e>,<s,t>> . !s : "!x f (!s.x)(s) = 1. #x f((!s’.x)(s) = 1       
            (Elbourne 2005:51) 
  
According to (32), the takes as arguments an NP and a situation, which is 
presupposed to contain exactly one element satisfying that NP predicate. The 
entire definite DP then denotes the unique individual which satisfies the NP in 
that situation. (31a-b) therefore (roughly) assert that: every minimal situation s1 
containing a man and a donkey he owns is part of an extended situation s2 in 
which the unique man in s2 beats the unique donkey in s2. Because there is only 
one donkey and one man in s2, we correctly predict that each man beats the 
donkey he owns in s1. Since this is true for every minimal situation s1 containing a 
man-owning-donkey pair, we correctly predict that every man beats all the 
donkeys he owns.  
 
 
6.  Analysis 
  
We want to analyze pronouns as (basically) determiners, to capture the 
parallelism in their non-familiar semantics. We also need a denotation for the 
pronouns which allows donkey-binding, as well as all the other interpretations of 
pronouns. Let’s start with Elbourne’s (2005:51) denotation for it, which satisfies 
the latter requirements: 
 
(32) [[ it ]] 
g
 = !f <<s,e>,<s,t>> . !s : "!x f (!s.x)(s) = 1. #x f((!s’.x)(s) = 1               
 
 For St’át’imcets, there is an apparent problem with (32), namely the 
uniqueness presupposition. For English, the uniqueness presupposition of (32) is 
expected, because English third-person pronouns are definite. But we have seen 
that in St’át’imcets the pronouns, just like the full DPs, are not definite. 
 There are a couple of possible routes we could take to solve this problem. 
One possibility would be to alter Elbourne’s denotation by deleting the offending 
presupposition. However, Elbourne (following Heim and others) needs the 
uniqueness presupposition on the pronoun to ensure that the right men beat the 
                                                
10
Tomioka (2003) also finds striking parallels between the interpretations of Japanese pro and 
those of full Japanese DPs. Interestingly, Japanese pro allows interpretations St’át’imcets pro does 
not, involving existential closure. 
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right donkeys. Recall that Elbourne’s denotation derives that fact that in (31), 
every minimal situation s1 containing a man and a donkey he owns is part of an 
extended situation s2 in which the unique man in s2 beats the unique donkey in s2. 
Because there is only one donkey and one man in s2, we correctly predict that 
each man beats the donkey he owns in s1 (see Elbourne 2005:52). Without the 
uniqueness presupposition, we simply do not derive the correct semantics for a 
donkey sentence; thus, this option appears to be a non-starter. Note also that the 
presupposition on the donkey pronoun is used by von Fintel (1994:158ff) to 
derive the anomaly of (33) and other similar cases: 
 
(33)   #If there isn’t a donkey in the backyard, we should feed it.  
 
The St’át’imcets counterparts of cases like (33) are infelicitous just as in English, 
as shown in (34). This again suggests that we cannot simply do away with the 
presupposition.  
 
(34)   #lh=cw7áoz=as káku7 ku=ts’í7 l=ti=lep’calten-lhkálh=a,   
 HYP=NEG=3CONJ DEIC DET=deer PREP=DET=garden-1PL.POSS=EXIS  
  áma=ka lh=am’ts-án’-m=as   proABS 
  good=IRR COMP=feed-DIR-1PL.ERG=CONJ proABS 
 ‘If there isn’t a deer in the garden, we should feed it.’ 
 
 A second option to deal with the problematic presupposition would be to 
claim that (32), in spite of involving a uniqueness presupposition, does not 
involve familiarity. This would mean that we could adopt (32) for St’át’imcets 
pronouns, but for English pronouns, we would need to add some extra familiarity 
requirement.  
 The debate about familiarity vs. uniqueness in English definite 
descriptions has a long history; see Heim (1982, 1983), Kadmon (1987), Hawkins 
(1991), Birner and Ward (1994), Abbott (1999, 2003, 2005), Ludlow and Segal 
(2002), Szabo (2000, 2003), among many others, for discussion. It is not my goal 
to add to this debate, and I will remain agnostic on how the familiarity effect for 
English definites is derived. However, the analysis I will argue for below does 
rely on the idea that what differentiates English and St’át’imcets pronouns and 
determiners is not uniqueness, but familiarity. The core generalization is as 
follows: while in both languages, pronouns have uniqueness effects, only in 
English do pronouns have a familiarity effect.11 I will achieve this result not by 
altering Elbourne’s denotation for English definites, but rather by relying on a 
language-wide parametric difference in the nature of presuppositions, which I 
have previously proposed on the basis of other presupposition triggers 
(Matthewson 2006). Once we accept that in the entire St’át’imcets language, 
presuppositions have a different discourse effect than they do in English, we will 
be able to adopt Elbourne’s (32) for both languages and derive the correct results.  
 The basic claim (see Matthewson 2006) is that presuppositions in 
                                                
11
In Matthewson (in press) I propose something similar for St’át’imcets nukw ‘some, other’, 
which possesses a non-maximality presupposition but lacks the familiarity effect of English other.  
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St’át’imcets do not place the same constraints on the common ground as English 
presuppositions do. The core fact which led me to make this proposal is that von 
Fintel’s (2004) ‘Hey, wait a minute!’ test fails to apply in St’át’imcets. The 
HWAM test is illustrated in (35), from von Fintel (2004:271). We see that it is 
felicitous to challenge a failed presupposition with an expression of surprise, but 
it is not felicitous to challenge an previously unknown assertion in the same way. 
The test thus provides an excellent way to detect presuppositions as opposed to 
asserted material. 
 
(35) A: The mathematician who proved Goldbach’s Conjecture is a woman.  
 B: Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that someone proved Goldbach’s 
Conjecture. 
 B’: #Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that that was a woman.  
 
 In St’át’imcets, elements which correspond to a range of English 
presupposition triggers have been tested (e.g., words for ‘again’, ‘also’, ‘stop’, 
‘more’, and cleft constructions). Failure of the hypothesized presuppositions are 
never challenged by hearers in a way which distinguishes failed presuppositions 
from new asserted information. One example is given in (36).  
 
(36) Context: A couple are in love and decide to get married. As far as she 
knows, he has never been married before. He says to her: 
 
 áma n-scwákwekwekw=a kw=en=s=cuz’ melyíh múta7 
 good 1SG.POSS-heart=EXIS DET=1SG.POSS=NOM=going.to marry again 
 ‘I’m happy to be getting married again.’ 
 
 What would she reply? 
 
 áma t’it n-scwákwekw=a  
 good also 1SG.POSS-heart=EXIS 
 ‘I’m also happy.’  
 
The use of múta7 ‘again’ in (36) does not phase the consultant in the slightest, and 
she does not offer a HWAM response. The reader is referred to Matthewson 
(2006) for similar results for a range of other presupposition triggers.  
 Data such as this have led me to argue that the St’át’imc language as a 
whole does not require presuppositions to be shared knowledge between speaker 
and hearer. Thus, I analyze the elements which correspond to English 
presupposition triggers as also triggering presuppositions in St’át’imcets, but of a 
different type. Following Gauker’s (1998) analysis of English (which, however, I 
reject for English, following von Fintel 2000), I argue that a presupposition in 
St’át’imcets merely represents the speaker’s own take on the propositional context 
(where the propositional context contains propositions that ‘are relevant to the 
conversational aims of the interlocutors, whether they are aware of these facts or 
not’ (Gauker 1998:150)). The effect of this is that it looks in St’át’imcets like 
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accommodation always takes place (except if the accommodated presupposition is 
necessarily false). This means that although presuppositions exist in St’át’imcets, 
we won’t detect them as easily as in English. Once we adopt this analysis, we can 
use Elbourne’s (32) for St’át’imcets pronouns, and still predict the absence of 
familiarity effects.12 
 The claim that the St’át’imcets elements do possess presuppositions, 
which nevertheless do not give rise to HWAM effects, is supported by the fact 
that consultants will give meta-linguistic judgments that utterances involving 
presupposition failure ‘should not be said’. These judgments survive even under 
negation and other presupposition holes. With respect specifically to the 
pronouns, the account predicts that the uniqueness presupposition of St’át’imcets 
pro will be detectable in cases apart from donkey sentences, even though it does 
not place a restriction on the common ground. This is shown in (37), where the 
singular determiner is rejected in a case where the referent is non-unique.  
 
(37)  Context: There are two cups, which both look exactly the same, on the 
table. I want one to pour my coffee into it. I ask you:13 
 
         #sima7-cí-ts   ti=zew’áksten=a 
 come.here-IND-1SG.OBJ DET=cup=EXIS  
 ‘Give me the cup.’ 
  
 sima7-cí-ts   ku=pála7 zew’áksten 
 come.here-IND-1SG.OBJ DET=one cup 
 ‘Give me one cup.’ 
 
If the determiner ti…a had no uniqueness presupposition, there would be no 
reason for the first reply in (37) to be bad. 
 In summary, we can adopt Elbourne’s (32) directly for St’át’imcets pro 
(with a plural version for wit), correctly accounting for both the donkey 
interpretations as well as for the fact that St’át’imcets pronouns, while possessing 
uniqueness presuppositions, can be used in novel contexts. The cross-linguistic 
variation in familiarity effects for pronouns/Ds derives from a broader lack of 
familiarity effects in the entire St’át’imc language.  
 
 
7.  A Non-Parallel Between Pronouns and Full DPs 
  
Now we turn to a complication. It turns out that in spite of the parallels discussed 
so far between St’át’imcets pronouns and full DPs, the two classes actually differ 
on almost all the core interpretations: unlike pronouns, full DPs allow only 
                                                
12
There is of course a large current literature on the nature of presuppositions and whether and 
how they affect the felicity of discourse, which I cannot address here; see Beaver (2001), Zeevat 
(2003), Abusch (2005), Simons (2001, 2006a,b), Schlenker (2008a,b), among many others. 
13
See Gillon (2006) for a different result in Skwxwú7mesh Salish, where the counterpart 
determiner to St’át’imcets ti…a can be used in the situation in (37).  
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referential interpretations. This is schematized in (38).14  
 
(38) interpretation pronouns full DPs 
 referential ! ! 
 bound variable ! x 
 donkey ! x 
 other E-type ! x 
 
 (39-40) show that St’át’imcets does not allow bound variable readings of 
full DPs. 
 
(39) qwal’út.-s-as s=Mary tákem i=kúkwpi7=a kéla7  
 talk-CAUS-3ERG NOM=Mary all DET.PL=chief=EXIS first  
  s=tsicw=s ti=kúkwpi7=a l=ti=q’élza7ten=a 
  NOM=went=3POSS DET=chief=EXIS PREP=DET=sweatlodge=EXIS  
 ‘Mary talked to every chief before the chief went into the sweatlodge.’ 
 
 Does it mean she talked to each chief before that chief went in? “No, that 
would be i kukwpi7a [plural] – ti kukwpi7a means just one.” 
 
(40) qwal’út.-s-as s=Mary tákem i=kúkwpi7=a múta7  
 talk-CAUS-3ERG NOM=Mary all DET.PL=chief=EXIS and  
  i=sesq’wez’-í=ha kéla7 lh=as ulhcw   
  DET.PL=y’ger.sibling-3PL.POSS=EXIS first COMP-3CONJ enter  
  ti=kúkwpi7=a l=ti=7ístkena  
  DET=chief=EXIS PREP=DET=pithouse 
 ‘Mary talked to every chief and his brother before the chief went into the 
pithouse.’ 
  
 Consultant’s comment: “Only one chief went into the [pithouse].” 
 
(41-42) illustrate the absence of donkey full DPs; see also (4) above. 
 
(41)   #tákem i=sqáycw=a  wa7 s-tsúwa7 i=ts’qáx7=a  
 all DET.PL=man=EXIS IMPF STAT-own DET.PL=horse=EXIS  
  ama-s-twítas  ti=ts’qáx7=a  
  good-CAUS-3PL.ERG DET=horse=EXIS  
 ‘Every man who owns a horse loves the horse.’ 
  
 Consultant’s comment: “No, because it’s only one horse.” 
 
 
                                                
14
When full DPs contain pronouns, the pronouns may be bound, giving rise to apparent narrow 
scope/bound readings for the full DP (Kratzer’s 1998 ‘pseudo-scope’). See Matthewson (1999) for 
analysis, and see (9) above for an example. 
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(42)   *lh=wá7=as sqáxa7 ti=sqáycw=a, wa7 papt  
 COMP=IMPF=3CONJ dog DET=man=EXIS IMPF always  
  tsew’-en-ás ti=sqáx7=a 
  kick-DIR-3ERG DET=dog=EXIS 
 ‘If/when a man owns a dog, he always kicks the dog.’ 
 
(43-44) show that using absent or plural determiners doesn’t save the donkey DP. 
 
(43)   # tákem i=sqáycw=a wa7 s-tsúwa7 i=ts’qáx7=a  
 all DET.PL=man=EXIS IMPF STAT-own DET.PL=horse=EXIS  
  ama-s-twítas  ni=ts’qáx7=a  
  good-CAUS-3PL.ERG DET.ABS=horse=EXIS  
 ‘Every man who owns a horse loves the horse.’ 
  
 Consultant’s comment: “No. It’s still only one.” 
 
(44)   # tákem i=sqáycw=a wa7 s-tsúwa7 i=ts’qáx7=a  
 all DET.PL=man=EXIS IMPF STAT-own DET.PL=horse=EXIS  
  ama-s-twítas  i=ts’qáx7=a  
  good-CAUS-3PL.ERG DET.PL=horse=EXIS  
 ‘Every man who owns a horse loves the horses.’ 
 
 Consultant’s comment: “They love all the horses. Not just their own, but 
all of them.”  
 
(45) shows that full DPs cannot have E-type readings, unlike pronouns.15  
 
(45)  # wa7 tsutánwas k=John kw=s=cuz’ kwámem 
 IMPF think DET=John DET=NOM=going.to take  
  ku=ts’úqwaz’ nílh=t’u7 xát’-min’-as 
  DET=fish FOC=just want-RED-3ERG 
  kw=en=cuz’   q’wél-en ti=ts’úqwaz’=a 
  DET=1SG.POSS=going.to cook-DIR DET=fish=EXIS 
 ‘John thinks he’s going to catch a fish, and he wants me to cook the fish.’ 
 
 Consultant’s comment: “No, because he hasn’t caught it yet.”   
 
 The challenge, then, is that St’át’imcets pronouns and full DPs are similar 
in lacking familiarity, but differ in that the full DPs lack any bound, donkey or E-
type interpretations. The solution must be that the St’át’imcets overt determiners 
have some extra constraint which stops them having covarying interpretations.  
 The idea I will propose is that deictic features of the overt DPs force 
reference to the discourse situation, and this prevents binding or variation across 
situations. This will rule out both bound variable readings and all E-type 
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readings.16 The idea is reminiscent of work by Wolter (2007), who claims that 
‘proximal demonstratives may resist opaque interpretations simply because they 
require the referent to be close to the speaker, which is incompatible with 
variation across worlds.’ 
 The denotation for pro is repeated in (46), and the revised denotation for 
the singular proximal determiner is given in (47), with the deictic presupposition 
underlined.  
 
(46) [[ pro ]] 
g,c
 = !f <<s,e>,<s,t>> . !s : "!x f (!s.x)(s) = 1 . #x f((!s’.x)(s) = 1 
 
(47) [[ ti…a ]] 
g,c
 = !f <<s,e>,<s,t>> . !s : "!x f ((!s.x)(so) = 1 where so is proximal to 
the speaker in c . #x f(x)(so) = 1 
 
ti…a takes as one of its arguments an NP (e.g., smúlhats ‘woman’), and 
presupposes that the salient proximal situation s0 contains exactly one element 
satisfying that NP. The entire DP denotes the unique individual which satisfies the 
NP in s0. (48), for example, roughly asserts that every minimal situation s1 
containing a man and a horse he owns is part of an extended situation s2 in which 
the unique man in s2 loves the unique horse in the proximal situation s0. 
 
(48)   # tákem i=sqáycw=a wa7 s-tsúwa7 i=ts’qáx7=a  
 all DET.PL=man=EXIS IMPF STAT-own DET.PL=horse=EXIS  
  ama-s-twítas  ti=ts’qáx7=a  
  good-CAUS-3PL.ERG DET=horse=EXIS  
 ‘Every man who owns a horse loves the horse.’ 
 
This means that every man loves a single horse which is in the vicinity of the 
speaker – which correctly accounts for consultants’ judgments about this kind of 
sentence.  
 This analysis predicts that the individual denoted by the DP must satisfy 
the NP predicate in s0. This is correct, as shown in (49-50).  
 
(49) Context (‘The Dog Children’ legend; van Eijk and Williams 1981): There 
is a dog who changes into a man every night, then back into a dog the next 
day. During the day, when he’s a dog, you see him hanging around his 
food bowl and you say: 
 
        #wa7  q’7-ál’men ti=sqáycw=a 
 IMPF eat-want DET=man=EXIS 
 ‘The man is hungry.’ 
 
                                                
16
cf. a slightly different approach to a similar generalization by Gillon (2006). Gillon shows 
that in Skwxwú7mesh, deictic DPs can take wide scope, while non-deictic DPs must take narrow 
scope. She argues that this is because deictic features prevent a DP from composing via Restrict 
(Chung and Ladusaw 2004). 
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(50) Context: Same as (49), except that you saw the dog at night when he was a 
man and he was climbing in the window of a woman’s house. You say: 
 
        #wa7 t’k’wíw-lec ni=sqáx7=a  lh=7úlhcw=as  
 IMPF climb-AUT DET.ABS=dog=EXIS COMP=enter=3CONJ 
  l=ti=nk’wanústen=a 
  PREP=DET=window=EXIS  
 ‘The dog was climbing in the window.’ 
  
 Consultant’s comment: “No, because he was a man [when you saw him] 
and you have to say what you see.” 
 
 The claim that a full DP in St’át’imcets always denotes an individual in 
the discourse situation predicts that a singular full DP should never allow a co-
varying interpretation, even in bridging cases.17 This prediction is largely upheld. 
Typical cases are shown in (51-52); the overt DP can only denote one individual 
(unlike in English with a definite DP). 
  
(51)  #papt lh=en tsicw pál7alts-min i=ucwalmícw=a, 
 always HYP=1SG.POSS get.there visit-APPL DET.PL=person=EXIS 
  wá7=lhkan qwal’út.-s ti=kúkwpi7=a 
  IMPF=1SG.SUBJ talk-CAUS DET.PL=chief=EXIS   
 ‘Every time a visit a reserve, I talk to the chief.’   
 
 Consultant’s comment: “Single chief.” 
 
(52) tákem=t’u7 i=áz’=a ku=púkw pzán-itas  
 all=just DET.PL=buy=EXIS DET=book meet(DIR)=3PL.ERG  
  ti=mets-en-táli=ha 
  DET-write-DIR-TOP=EXIS   
 ‘Everyone that bought a book had met the author.’ 
 
 Consultant’s comment: “Same author [for everyone].” 
 
There are a few cases where consultants accept co-varying interpretations of full 
DPs in bridging cases. These seem to be all instances of what Schwarz (2008) 
calls ‘situational uniqueness’. That is, the relevant referent is always in a part-
whole relation to some prior referent, rather than being e.g., the producer of a 
product (as in (52)). An E-type overt DP in a situational uniqueness case is given 
in (53). An explanation for these cases will have to wait for future research.  
 
(53) tákem i=wa7  áma k=wa  tqálk’-em wa7 
 all DET.PL=IMPF good DET=IMPF drive-MID IMPF 
  
                                                
17
Thanks to Florian Schwarz for discussion of this point.  
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  n7án’was-aka7-mín-itas ti=tqálk’-ten=a 
  two-hand-APPL-3PL.ERG DET=drive-INSTR=EXIS  
 ‘Everyone who drives a car well holds on to the wheel with both hands.’   
 
 In sum, I have argued that we can use Elbourne’s analysis of the/it for the 
St’át’imcets pronouns, and appeal to the deictic features of the overt determiners 
to achieve the lack of bound variable, donkey, and E-type readings of full DPs.18 
 
 
8.  Implications for the Analysis of Determiners and VP-Ellipsis19 
 
Recall that full DPs with determiners which end in =a allow only referential 
readings. They appear to take only widest scope with respect to any scope-bearing 
element, as illustrated in (54). 
 
(54)  #tákem i=sqáyqeycw=a melyíh-s-as ti=emhál’qwem’=a syáqtsa7  
 all DET.PL=men=EXIS marry-CAUS-3ERG DET=beautiful=EXIS woman  
 ‘All the men married a beautiful woman.’  
 [They all marry the same one; wide-scope object] 
 
In Matthewson (1999, 2001) I applied a choice function analysis to the =a 
determiners in St’át’imcets. The choice function is existentially closed with 
obligatorily widest scope. That analysis correctly predicts that all non-polarity 
DPs take obligatory wide scope. 
 The problem is that as shown by Davis (2004), VP ellipsis in St’át’imcets 
allows sloppy readings:  
 
(54) áylh=t’u7 áts’x-en-as ta=swúw’h=a kw=s=Lémya7 múta7 
 now=just see-DIR-3ERG DET=cougar=EXIS DET=NOM=Léma7 and 
  áylh=kan=t’u7 t’it 
  now=1SG.SUBJ=just also 
 ‘Lémya7 just saw a cougar, and I just did, too.’ [can be different cougars] 
 
(55)  cúz’=lhkacw=ha   ts’áqw-an’ ta=íxitsa 
 going.to=2SG.SUBJ=YNQ eat-DIR  DET=woodworm=EXIS 
                                                
18
As mentioned in footnote 1, Roberts (2004) and others argue that English pronouns have an 
extra salience requirement not shared by definite descriptions. Preliminary investigations suggest a 
similar result in St’át’imcets, as shown in (i). This raises interesting questions about the story-
beginning data presented in section 3, which I must leave for future research. 
 
(i) kwís-ts=kan i=q’ém’p=a metsláka7, t’u7 q’em’pálmen=t’u7  
 fall-CAUS=1SG.SUBJ DET.PL=ten=EXIS pen but nine=just  
  i=pún-an=a.   t’pán’k-s=a=k’a  ti=q’íl’q=a  
  DET.PL=find-1SG.ERG=EXIS under-3POSS=EXIS=EPIS DET=chair=EXIS 
   lh=wá7=as  lak xek ti=núkw=a / # proABS    
   HYP=IMPF=3CONJ  lie maybe DET=other=EXIS / # proABS 
 ‘I dropped 10 pens and only found 9 of them. The other one /#it is probably under the chair.’ 
19
Material in this section relies on Davis and Matthewson (2008). 
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   [lh=cúz’=an kéla7] 
  [COMP=going.to=1SG.CONJ first]   (Davis 2004) 
 ‘Will you eat a woodworm if I do first?’ [can be a different woodworm] 
 
 If we copy the VP, and existentially close the choice function with widest 
scope, we derive only the strict reading. In (56), we must see the same cougar. 
 
(56) !f [["x . x saw f(cougar)](Lémya7) & ["x . x saw f(cougar)](I)] 
  
The only way to derive a sloppy reading is to have two different choice functions, 
one for the overt DP and one for the elided one, as in (57): 
 
(57) !f !g [["x . x saw f(cougar)](Lémya7) & ["x . x saw g(cougar)](I)] 
 
But this violates parallelism constraints on VP ellipsis: randomly changing 
variables in the elided VP is not allowed (Fiengo and May 1994). 
 However, the analysis I have argued for above solves this problem. Recall 
that pronouns in St’át’imcets can function as bound variables, while full DPs 
cannot. I derived this contrast from the idea that the overt determiners contain 
deictic features. The sloppy identity facts now show that elided DPs parallel 
pronouns in their ability to function as bound variables. The generalization 
therefore is that whenever the determiner is not pronounced, bound variable 
anaphora is possible. All we have to assume, then, is that when a determiner is 
elided, it loses its deictic features. Its denotation reduces to that of a pronoun, and 
sloppy identity is predicted in the same way as Elbourne’s analysis of English 
pronouns/determiners predicts sloppy identity. 
 There is independent evidence that deictic features are lost under ellipsis, 
coming from VP-ellipsis cases where the required deictic properties of the overt 
DP and the elided DP differ, yet the identity condition on ellipsis is clearly 
satisfied. This is shown in (58), which would be bad with an overt absent 
determiner on ‘Bill’s grandmother’.  
 
(58) Context: John’s grandmother is dead [i.e., absent], Bill’s grandmother is 
still alive and is sitting with us in the room [i.e., present].  
 
 stexw wa7 xwey-s-ás na=kwékwa7-s=a   
 very IMPF love-CAUS-3ERG DET.ABS=grandmother-3POSS=EXIS   
   s=John,  stexw t’it s=Bill 
  NOM=John  very also NOM=Bill 
 ‘John really loves his grandmother, and so does Bill.’ [sloppy ok] 
 
 
9.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper I have argued that the semantics of third-person pronouns is cross-
linguistically variable, but in at least two languages, the pronouns share basic 
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semantics with determiners in the relevant language. I have claimed that 
languages vary in the discourse effects of their presuppositions, and this can affect 
determiners and third-person pronouns as well as other presupposition triggers. I 
have argued that determiners may have extra deictic features which prevent 
binding, and that a situation semantics analysis captures all the facts about 
St’át’imcets determiners more successfully than the prior choice function 
analysis.  
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